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Finance and insurance
Internationalisation of the
finance sector: a process
under review 
Internationalisation of the economy is an undeniable fact. Many
branches, especially within the industrial sector, have increased
their international relations in recent years by either selling a part
of their output abroad, creating stable cross-border business
contacts, setting up an own commercial network or placing
production chains outside the country of origin. Reasons to explain
this process are mainly based on a considerable reduction of
transport costs and improvement of communications, stimulated by
technological development playing now a key role. However, from
an entrepreneurial point of view, it is obvious that industrial
internationalisation has different connotations from those arising
from internationalisation of services. Without going too much into
detail of possible exceptions, it could be said that industrial
internationalisation tends to pose less difficulties.
XAVIER SEGURA
RAMON ROIG
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Benefits of
internationalisation of
financial services
Just like Ricardo’s (1772-1823) findings served
to understand and explain the expansion 
of international trade, internationalisation of
finance – i.e. eliminating discrimination
between foreign and domestic financial serv-
ice providers and cross-border barriers to
financial service provision – is also the result
of a global interest.
As an example of these benefits, the conclu-
sions of a study ordered by the European
Commission on potential consequences of
integration into such a relevant market like
mortgages in the European Union are interest-
ing. The main conclusion is that obstacles
restricting cross-border business in the mort-
gage market – from both the offer and the
demand perspective – have an average cost
equivalent to 0.7% of the EU GDP (gross
domestic product) due to reduced competition
and possibilities of choice within the market.
Financial expansion of the last
years broke the link between the
customer and the broker giving
credit and taking the risk in the 
first instance.
The relation between liberalisation of financial
markets and economic development has been
widely explored by numerous studies, and
there are plenty of countries where liberalisa-
tion of financial services has been planned and
eventually became the trigger of economic
development. The very case of Spain is a good
example, with foreign banks allowed to enter
after 1978 following a whole range of liberali-
sation measures to bring about progressive
modernisation and efficiency of the Spanish
finance system. Although these banks were
eventually not especially relevant, it is true that
this action and all others taken in that time 
led to an ongoing modernisation process that
improved competitiveness of the domestic
finance sector.
Liberalisation of financial services requires
however accurate institutional management,
especially of regulation and supervision func-
tions, which can be done by the relevant
authorities but also needs to be based on the
principles of information transparency in line
with the new Basle agreement, so it is the mar-
ket that provides discipline of institutions to a
certain extent.
The financial crisis.
Lessons for
internationalisation 
of financial services
This is why we need to learn from the mistakes
that led us to a big global crisis of the finance
system that burst out in mid 2007 and eventu-
ally developed into the first big global eco-
nomic crisis. This financial crisis has been the
result of the combination of a long period of
high liquidity in markets and the proliferation
of new financial instruments and practices in
which risk assessment was done wrongly.
These very instruments and practices led to
great expansion of financial titles that were
after all upheld by financing a basis of physical
assets, mainly real estate, that eventually lost
their value. All in all, a big mass of real estate
had become a big mass of mortgage, which in
turn had become by means of complex finan-
cial structures an even bigger mass of financial
titles that were financed and refinanced with-
out anybody being actually able to know their
implicit risk level. So the link broke between
the customer and the broker giving credit and
taking the risk in the first instance.
Within this scenario, the Lehman Brothers case
stands out particularly. That big US-based
financial corporation founded in 1850 with an
The internationalisation of services98
A_12_Segura+Roig_96-107.qxp:N4  28/6/10  16:37  Página 98
absolutely global business view has been the
big loser of the current financial crisis. Lehman
Brothers survived the American Civil War, the
1907 banking crisis, the 1929 crash and the
hedge funds collapse in 1998 but has been
unable to endure the mid-2007 subprime crisis,
causing the biggest bankruptcy in history.
So Lehman Brothers is a reference for how the
financial sector will need to tackle globalisa-
tion. The American company had become a
global financial business present in more than
forty countries and with over 650 legal entities
outside the United States, including sub-
sidiaries in places like the Cayman Islands, the
Bermuda Islands, Switzerland, Hong Kong and
Singapore, an immense financial conglomerate
going far beyond the supervisory reach of the
Federal Reserve and US authorities as well as a
complex management system that was literally
termed a «chaos» in the report analysing how
to address the company’s winding-up process.
Hedge funds as a paradigm of
internationalisation of finance
The concepts of crisis, internationalisation and
laxity regarding regulation find their finest par-
adigm in the business model of hedge funds,
free investment funds with a wide variety in
operations, investing in debt, stock or com-
modities, combined with derivatives or short
sales.
George Soros: «Find the trend
whose premise is false and then bet
against it.»
In fact, the financial crisis properly started in
summer 2007 based on the problems that
overcame two hedge funds of Bear Stearns,
who had much of their investment in high-risk
assets. What followed was governmental
takeover of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae
mortgage corporations, bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers, acquisition of Merrill Lynch by the
Bank of America, rescue of AIG – the biggest
insurance company in the US with a big
turnover in credit default swaps (CDS) – and
bankruptcy of Washington Mutual, the biggest
US savings bank. As to the eurozone, the first
big victim was Fortis insurance company,
which had to be intervened by Belgian, Dutch
and Luxembourg authorities as its share value
was plummeting. Other companies with major
problems following later were Hypo Real
Estate Bank, Dexia and ING, just to name
some prominent cases.
Investment of sovereign funds often
has a long-term perspective and a
certain strategic component.
However, regulation of hedge funds has
become a controversial matter, proving the 
difficulties in making headway towards stricter
legislation. Their detractors insist in arguing
that their great leveraging capacity – allowing
them to handle extraordinarily large portfolios
– gives them a strong speculative character,
causing market instability to the point that
they have been compared with a «grasshopper
plague». Defenders in turn say that these funds
are in no case to be held responsible for any
financial crisis but only ultimately show the
imbalance created in markets, proving George
Soros’ maxim: «Find the trend whose premise
is false and then bet against it.» Both views 
are certainly right to a given extent, and the
difficulty lies in knowing how to adequately
legislate the fine borderline separating them.
And yet, hedge funds are not the only collec-
tive investment mode. Investment funds in
Spain are certainly a good example for interna-
tionalisation of finance within the reach of
families and companies, as their way of operat-
ing allows them to gather savings of many of
them till property reaches a given volume that
justifies professional management – often out
of an international perspective – through so-
called collective investment societies.
A different thing is the perspective of other
types of collective investment like sovereign
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funds. Their origin lies in growing imbalance
between countries as to their capacity of
financing and generating reserves. A main role
is played here by countries wealthy in raw
materials – basically oil and gas – like the
United Arab Emirates and Russia and with a
high export capacity like China. As opposed 
to hedge funds, investment of these sovereign
funds often has a long-term perspective and a
certain strategic component.
History and present of
internationalisation 
of the finance sector
Despite increasing internationalisation of
financial flows, social perception of financial
institutions is that they are still a hardly inter-
nationalised industry. After all, streets in our
cities are crammed with bank branches with
signs of mostly national brands. And it is this
reality what eventually pushes the European
Commission to work for deeper integration 
of the finance system, for beyond social per-
ception, the truth is that internationalisation 
of the finance sector regarding operations with
families and companies is far from the stan-
dard reached in other business sectors.
Internationalisation of the finance
sector regarding operations with
families and companies is far from
the standard reached in other
business sectors.
Comparison with the car industry will come in
handy here, an especially illustrative landmark
considering that the first internationalisation
cases of financial services are found one cen-
tury ago, when Citibank started operating in
France (1906), Argentina (1914) and Brazil
(1915), virtually the same years in which the
big car makers having exploited most the inter-
national side of their business were created
(Ford Motor Company in 1903 and General
Motors in 1908). These first internationalisation
cases in the finance sector were soon reinter-
preted by Barclays Bank, which in 1925 created
its international division by merging the Colo-
nial Bank, the Anglo-Egyptian Bank and the
National Bank of South Africa, an initiative
that has often been considered the first
attempt of creating a bank with a truly global
perspective.
The volume of external financing
obtained by the Spanish finance
sector is more than a quarter of 
the balance sheet of banks within the
finance system.
Despite this start, internationalisation reached
one century later by the finance sector is
clearly different from what is observed in the
car industry, whose business strategy is tackled
from a fully global perspective regarding sup-
pliers, manufacturing sites and sales points.
This unfavourable comparison does not mean
that change in the finance sector has not accel-
erated in recent years, although this has not
been made very visible in the streets of our
towns and cities. Although direct settling of
banks outside their domestic markets is the
clearest demonstration of internationalisation
of finance, it is definitely not the only one.
Seizing resources in international markets is
also an internationalisation process that has
had a strong echo in the Spanish and also the
Catalan finance sector.
Just to illustrate this process, the volume of
external financing obtained by the Spanish
finance sector in the shape of deposits or
acquisition of different shares reached 1.2 tril-
lion euros, which is more than a quarter of the
balance sheet of banks within the Spanish
finance system.
Following the car industry simile, it is as if
most car makers had gone international based
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on component supplies while sales are still
basically concentrated on the domestic market.
The euro as a potential
catalyst for integration of
the European system
Just like the creation of a single market in
Europe set the basis of a wider market, the
introduction of the euro as the single currency
enhanced international trade in the eurozone
as it eliminated the currency exchange risk in
transactions between member countries. How-
ever, the euro also brought about a single
monetary policy, a key element to the finance
sector in the area, which saw its main barrier
break up to start a strategy with a pan-European
perspective, the ultimate ingredient to facili-
tate full integration of the European finance
system.
According to ECB studies, European
integration of financial activity is
high in monetary and interbank
markets but low in retail banking.
This is how this has been seen from the Euro-
pean Central Bank (ECB), where regular moni-
toring of the degree of integration of financial
activity in the eurozone has been done over the
last years. ECB papers conclude that integra-
tion differs according to the area: it is very high
in monetary and interbank markets – with
expansion of cross-border transactions clearly
above progress observed at international level,
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Graph 1a. Assets and liabilities of the rest
of the world in the Spanish finance
Billion euros, excluding shares in capital
Source: Bank of Spain
The volume of external financing obtained by the Spanish finance sector reached 1.2 trillion euros.
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of the world in the Spanish finance system
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stimulated by the single currency – but low in
retail banking as it requires personal contact
between the bank and the customer, which is
difficult to reach if not done by placing the
offer directly in third countries.
This conclusion is backed by ECB data high-
lighting that the rate of assets financial insti-
tutions in the eurozone have in other
countries within this area is not higher than
20%, a figure that increased only slightly with
the introduction of the euro. Besides, this ratio
is below 10% in a quarter of eurozone coun-
tries and hardly surpasses 20% in most of
them (75% of countries have a rate below
25% of assets).
These data are relevant to understand that
internationalisation of financial activity within
service to families and companies requires after
all spatial proximity between offer and demand.
Such proximity should be materialised either
based on direct settling – opening own
branches – of banks in third countries or
through merger and acquisition processes of
companies already present in target markets.
Regarding the creation of own commercial
networks in third countries, data are really
modest, which could be reasonable if consid-
ering some elements working against it like
saturation of financial services, the need of
gaining trust of consumers and reaching a
minimum critical mass within a relatively
short period. The Spanish finance sector is a
good example of poor dynamism of this strat-
egy, with international presence through
direct establishment having even gone down
to only 120 branches in recent years after
reaching its peak in the early 1990s with more
than 200 branches.
According to this trend, it seems obvious that
internationalisation of the world finance sec-
tor demands a model based on cross-border
mergers and acquisitions. This has in fact been
the most common way in the Spanish finance
sector, not due to the creation of a single cur-
rency area but already much earlier, based on
the main banks, when a decided investment
policy in the main Latin American countries
was started over a decade ago.
In fact, the Spanish finance sector concen-
trated between 50% and 80% of Spanish for-
eign direct investment during these years,
with total shareholding investment surpassing
160 billion euros in late 2007. This rate is
opposed to little foreign direct investment in
the finance sector in Spain, which was only
about 10% of total foreign direct investment
in the last years.
The Latin American venture of big Spanish
banks that started in the mid 1990s explains
most of this investment. It came in after
unsuccessful attempts by American banks,
taking a radically different strategy as Spanish
banks went from the very beginning for
acquiring shares allowing them to take control
of already consolidated local banks. This strat-
egy was opposed to that followed by big US
banks like Citigroup and Fleet Boston, which
opened branches basically aimed at corporate
banking and better-off population segments.
Internationalisation of the world
finance sector is based on a model
of cross-border mergers and
acquisitions.
The goals pursued by big Spanish banks
entering this market were manifold. On the
one hand, they wanted to follow the big Span-
ish industrial groups that were then deploying
an internationalisation strategy (e.g. telecom-
munications companies and power utilities).
On the other, it was growth expectations pro-
vided by this strategy allowing to enlarge mar-
kets and deploy that growth potential
expected in that economic area. There were
also higher margins while Spain was experi-
encing increasing competition and margin
reduction following the derogation in 1992 of
the rule limiting expansion of savings banks
outside their home region.
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This process came together with implementa-
tion of several economic reforms in different
Latin American countries that were precisely
aimed at opening their banking systems to
foreign investment in order to improve their
efficiency.
Strategies implemented by each Spanish bank
had their own individual specificities, which
may illustrate possible future internationalisa-
tion models. In general terms, it could be said
that Banco Santander envisaged internationali-
sation by acquiring majority shares ensuring
full control over management, which often
eventually led to create a single brand. On the
other side, the BBV (merger with Argentaria
was only completed in 1999, some years after
initiating the internationalisation process)
strategy aimed at having first minority shares
in order to seek cooperation with local partners.
Finally, Banco Central Hispano – which com-
pleted its merger with Banco Santander also in
1999 – followed a strategy rather aimed at cre-
ating joint ventures with local partners.
As opposed to what had probably
been expected, the number of 
cross-border merger and acquisition
agreements within Europe has even
reduced.
In the case of savings banks, internationalisa-
tion was burdened by limitations to expanding
outside the own region until 1992. Within the
context in which big Spanish banks were look-
ing to Latin America, savings banks still had
hardly any possibility of expanding beyond
their local borders. In fact, this situation
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reached a grotesque highlight when “la Caixa”
started opening branches in France in 1988
while still having restrictions to do so in the
rest of Spain. Things eventually came to rea-
sonable terms and savings banks were able to
start their own expansion process beyond their
own region, spreading first all over Spain while
leaving expansion abroad for a later stage as it
seemed beyond logic to go to new markets
with domestic expansion still to be completed.
However, as opposed to what had probably
been expected, the number of cross-border
merger and acquisition agreements within
Europe has even reduced, and they only occa-
sionally amounted to a relevant portion of
overall mergers and acquisitions completed in
the EU-27. The exceptions were 2005 with the
first big cross-border merger within the euro-
zone involving German HVB and Italian 
Unicredit and 2008, when ABN Amro was
bought by a European consortium including
the Royal Bank of Scotland, Fortis and Banco
Santander. Apart from these two years, cross-
border mergers and acquisitions amounted to
hardly 20% of total agreements completed in
the European Union, a relatively poor figure
compared with expectations.
Within the internationalisation process of the
Spanish finance system, the Banco Santander
case takes a relevant position. After consolidat-
ing its establishment in Latin America, it set its
focus decidedly on Europe, especially the
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United Kingdom, where it first bought Abbey
in 2004 before completing the process in 2009
with the acquisition of Alliance & Leicester
(A&L) and the distribution and business chan-
nels of Bradford & Bingley. This made Banco
Santander the second largest bank in the
British market as to mortgage volume and the
third in private deposit volume as well as the
international bank with most branches in the
world. Banco Santander thus became a good
example of internationalisation with a global
strategic view, which shows in facts as straight-
forward as its policy of operating with its brand
in all markets it is present in.
Bancassurance, an
opportunity for
internationalisation
The bancassurance business, i.e. commercialis-
ing insurances through bank branches, has
been playing an increasingly important role
over the last years. This combined service came
up strongly in Spain during the 1990s, partly
due to growth expectations created by pension
funds and retirement plans. Synergies between
typical banking products and these new ones
from insurance quickly materialised, so finan-
cial institutions started commercialising them
through their wide distribution network. The
market share reached by bancassurance opera-
tors is representative of the success of this
model, which concentrates more than two
thirds of life assurances.
However, it needs to be said that most of this
business model emerged out of the creation of
insurance subsidiaries of banks specialising in
life assurances, which produced a certain
atomisation of the sector, as opposed to the
profile of insurance companies offering non-
life products (car insurance, home insurance,
etc.), which tended to concentrate heavily and
often reach a strong international business per-
spective. In contrast to what is occurring in the
banking sector, the Spanish insurance branch
is dominated by names like Allianz, Zurich,
Axa, Generali, Fortis and Aegon, which indi-
cates a clear international component. This
range of companies is to be completed with
Mapfre, the Spanish domestic market leader,
though also present in 42 countries, where it
concentrates up to 50% of its business.
Future perspectives point towards a new step
in developing bancassurance, thus creating 
an increasing market share of this business
model within non-life insurance, which
amounted to less than 10% of the total busi-
ness in 2009. However, as opposed to what
occurred in life assurances, the trend indicates
that here it will be based on business models
emerging from cooperation between already
consolidated banks and insurance companies,
either on the basis of distribution agreements,
strategic partnerships or joint ventures or cre-
ating financial service groups.
Future perspectives point towards 
a new step in developing
bancassurance within non-life
insurance, which can enhance
internationalisation of banking.
This new development perspective of bancas-
surance can definitely enhance internationali-
sation of banking, taking advantage of the
benefits of wide commercial networks of banks
and savings banks and the international per-
spective reached by the insurance business.
Future challenges
According to this analysis, it can be said that
the degree of internationalisation of the
finance sector at global and even European
level is far from expectations created over the
last years. The introduction of the euro and the
implementation of a single monetary policy
were certainly assumed as the beginning of an
intensive, promising internationalisation
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process in the finance business, which however
is far from reality in some areas.
This does not exclude that internationalisation 
of monetary markets has been especially rele-
vant, after all a reflection of increasing imbalance
occurring between countries with financing
capacity and those with financing needs. Just to
illustrate it, aggregated current account deficit 
of countries with a negative balance sheet
amounted to 654 trillion dollars in 2002, this 
figure reaching more than double in 2007, close
to 1.5 quadrillion dollars, and surpassing 1.6
quadrillion in 2008. This involves a growing
international flow of funds from countries with 
a higher savings capacity – mainly China, Japan,
Germany, Saudi Arabia, Russia and Switzerland
– to those with major financing needs, the most
relevant including the US, Spain, the UK, Aus-
tralia, Italy, France and Greece. The outburst of
the economic and financial crisis turned this
trend upside down, so aggregated current
account deficit was below a quadrillion dollars in
2009, almost a 40% reduction within one year.
After almost three years it is quite obvious that
the crisis cannot be interpreted as a sort of
break that will allow to retake the develop-
ment created in financial markets in the first
years of this century once it is over. We rather
need to think that the current crisis will open a
new period in the finance system with sub-
stantially different characteristics from the
models that have been in place so far, and this
will also affect internationalisation.
Regarding internationalisation of business
with families and companies, data show that
progress made so far in this area is very far
from expectations raised some years ago.
Nevertheless, institutions with a pan-Euro-
pean view may probably become more rele-
vant in years to come, competing with banks
characterised by focusing rather on the
national market. Interaction between and
coexistence of both strategies will in any case
unleash a trend towards standardisation of
financial products and services at European
level.
Progress in internationalisation of the finance
system will hardly be possible if challenges
from the lessons taught by the current crisis
are not tackled, which will require to deepen
into legislation and supervision of the finance
business. It will thus be inevitable to introduce
stricter rules for operations off the balance
sheet of banks, include more stringent liquid-
ity rules, regulate measures aimed at reducing
procyclicity of the finance business, increase
capital requirements, strengthen internal risk
control rules and review the mark-to-market
assessment principles, among many other
things.
Also, it seems obvious that participation of the
Spanish finance system in the next internation-
alisation phases will strongly depend on how
the already initiated restructuring and rational-
isation process of the domestic system devel-
ops, mainly regarding savings banks.
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